Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act by Royster, Judith
University of Tulsa College of Law
TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works
2008
Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-
Determination Act
Judith Royster
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1065 (2008).
  
1065 
 
PRACTICAL SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
THE INDIAN TRIBAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-
DETERMINATION ACT♦ 
by 
Judith V. Royster∗ 
This Article addresses the latest attempt by Congress to promote tribal self-
determination through a statute designed to increase tribal control over 
energy resource development on Indian lands. The author begins with a brief 
history of the gradual transfer of control over tribal resources from the federal 
government to tribes. This shift in government policy has culminated in the 
recent passage of the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-
Determination Act (ITEDSA), which allows some resource development 
without federal approval. ITEDSA allows tribes to enter into tribal energy 
resource agreements (TERAs) which give the tribes final decision-making 
power over their energy-related resources. The author notes that the increased 
sovereignty conferred by TERAs comes with several trade-offs. TERAs 
increase the risks of resource development while reducing some of the 
government’s trust responsibilities. TERAs shift some of the cost of resource 
development from the government to the tribes and provide for more public 
scrutiny of tribal affairs. The author ultimately concludes that the benefits of 
ITEDSA will outweigh the costs for certain tribes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the primary means of economic development for many 
Indian tribes is development of the reservation’s natural resources.1 Prior 
to the growth of the gaming industry in the 1990s, in fact, resource 
development was likely the major source of tribal economic 
development, and it remains so today for a substantial number of tribes.2 
The tribal mineral resource base is extensive.3 Nearly two million 
acres of Indian lands are subject to mineral leases administered by the 
1 See Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian Economic 
Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597, 634 (2004) (noting that long-term leasing is “an 
important revenue stream for many tribes, particularly those rich in natural 
resources”); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances 
for Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO? 
STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 2, 9 
(Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992) (positing that “[a]s natural resource 
endowments rise, so do the chances of success” in economic development). 
2 See, e.g., Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act and the Native American Energy Development 
and Self-Determination Act: Hearing on S. 424 and S. 522 Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 108th Cong. 115 (2003) [hereinafter ITEDSA Hearing] (statement of Vernon 
Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River Reservation) 
(noting that “the production of oil and gas reserves on the Wind River Reservation is 
the primary source of revenue for the Tribes”); Indian Energy Development: Regaining 
Self-Determination Over Reservation Resources: Oversight Hearing before S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess. 15 (2008) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (testimony of 
Chairman Carl Venne, Crow Nation) (stating that “most of our governmental 
revenue is derived from our 35-year relationship with Westmoreland Resources, 
Inc.”). 
3 In addition to the mineral resources noted in the text, more than 43 million 
acres of tribal lands are range and grazing land, and another 2.5 million acres are 
“crop areas.” Forest Service National Resource Guide to American Indian and Alaska 
Native Relations, App. D: Indian Nations (1997), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/ 
people/tribal/tribexd.pdf. Some 16–18 million acres, located on well over 200 Indian 
reservations in about half the states, are forest lands. INTERTRIBAL TIMBER COUNCIL, 
INDIAN FOREST MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM, AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN FORESTS AND 
FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1993), available at 
http://cnie.org/nae/docs/assessment.html#top [hereafter IFMAT Report] reports 
16 million acres of forested land on 214 reservations in twenty-three states. Fiscal 
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Department of the Interior,4 and the Bureau of Indian Affairs estimates 
that approximately 15 million additional acres of energy resources lie 
undeveloped.5 The direct economic impact of the resource base is 
likewise substantial. In fiscal year 2007, the Department of the Interior 
distributed more than $465.5 million in royalties and other mineral 
revenues.6 Production of energy resources on Indian lands represents 
more than ten percent of the total of federal on-shore energy 
production.7 
Despite the extent and economic importance of the mineral 
resources, however, tribal control over the development and use of tribal 
natural resources has historically been limited. In the last few decades, 
Indian tribes have gained a far greater role in decision-making 
concerning the use of their mineral resources. In part, this increased role 
results from tribes asserting a greater say in what occurs within their 
territories (practical sovereignty), and in part from new federal laws that 
place more of the decision-making power in tribal hands (political 
sovereignty). 
Using mineral development as an example, this Article briefly traces 
the historic trajectory of federal laws: comprehensive federal control and 
exploitation during the allotment period; a slight loosening of federal 
control, tribal consent, and concern with tribal revenue streams in the 
reorganization period; and new approaches focusing more on tribal 
participation, partnerships, and increased control during the modern era 
of self-determination. Most recently, Congress has begun to enact a next 
generation of resource development statutes that authorize tribes, subject 
report, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal 
Year 2005, at 10, www.doi.gov/bia/BIA_PAR_2005_FINAL_02232006_web.pdf reports 
nearly 18 million acres of forested land on 275 reservations in twenty-six states. 
4 U.S. Minerals Management Service, Total Producing and Non-Producing 
Leases by Category, Fiscal Year 2007, http://www.mrm.mms.gov/MRMWebStats/ 
Home.aspx (follow “Lease Data” hyperlink; then follow “Total by Category” 
hyperlink). 
5 ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 93 (statement of Theresa Rosier, Counselor to 
the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior). The 
department estimates that the undeveloped lands “contain over 5 billion barrels of 
oil, 37 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 53 billion tons of coal that are technically 
recoverable with current technologies.” Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 47 
(statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and 
Economic Development, Department of the Interior). In addition, the department 
identifies “118 reservations with a high potential for biomass production,” tribes with 
geothermal resources and opportunities for solar development, and approximately 
23 million acres on seventy-seven reservations “with class three or higher wind 
potential.” Id. 
6 U.S. Minerals Management Service, American Indian Reported Royalty 
Revenues, Fiscal Year 2007, http://www.mrm.mms.gov/MRMWebStats/Home.aspx 
(follow “Reported Royalties Revenue” hyperlink; then follow “American Indian 
Reported Royalty Revenues” hyperlink). 
7 ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 93–94 (statement of Theresa Rosier). 
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to Department of the Interior-approved general regulations, to enter into 
specific development agreements without federal approval. The most 
recent and wide-ranging of these next generation statutes is the Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act (ITEDSA) of 
2005. This Article examines the approach taken by ITEDSA, and then 
critiques the statute in light of its stated purpose of promoting tribal self-
determination. 
II. POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY, PRACTICAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
TRIBAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development 
has spent more than a decade and a half identifying the key factors in 
successful tribal economic development. Although by no means the sole 
factor, sovereignty has emerged as one of the crucial attributes of viable 
economic development. Sovereignty, in turn, has two aspects as identified 
by Harvard Project researchers Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt: 
“practical” and “political.” Political sovereignty, a part of the externalities 
of economic development, is largely “the extent to which a tribe has 
genuine control over reservation decision-making, the use of reservation 
resources, and relations with the outside world.”8 Federal Indian policy, 
the researchers contend, is “[t]he central determinant of political 
sovereignty.9 The more that federal policy promotes true tribal control 
over decision-making and resource use, the more likely development is to 
be successful.”10 
More important than political sovereignty, however, is what Cornell 
and Kalt refer to as “practical sovereignty,” that is: putting “practical 
decision-making power in the hands of Indian nations.”11 The concept of 
practical sovereignty builds upon political sovereignty, but moves beyond 
law and policy to actual on-the-ground governance. Practical sovereignty 
“puts the development agenda in Indian hands” and “marries decisions 
and their consequences, leading to better decisions.”12 Tribes exercising 
actual decision-making powers “consistently out-perform outside 
decision-makers.”13 So central is practical sovereignty to successful 
economic development that Cornell and Kalt state categorically that: 
8 Cornell & Kalt, Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 8. 
9 Id. at 13. 
10 Id. at 8. 
11 Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to Economic Development 
on American Indian Reservations: One Works, the Other Doesn’t, (Joint Occasional 
Papers on Native Affairs, No. 2005-02, 2006), at 12, available at http://www.jopna.net/ 
pubs/Jopna_2005-02_Approaches.pdf. 
12 Id. at 13. 
13 Miriam Jorgensen & Jonathan B. Taylor, What Determines Tribal Economic 
Success? Evidence from Tribal and Individual Indian Enterprises, (Harvard Project 
on American Indian Economic Development, PRS 00 -3, 2000), at 3, available at 
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After fifteen years of research and work in Indian Country, we 
cannot find a single case of sustained economic development in 
which an entity other than the Indian nation is making the major 
decisions about development strategy, resource use, or internal 
organization. In short, practical sovereignty appears to be a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for reservation economic 
development.14 
Thus, practical sovereignty “does not guarantee success,”15 but 
success without it is rare to nonexistent. 
Practical sovereignty, no less than political sovereignty, requires 
reducing the role of the federal government. Federal decision-making is 
“the default mode” of reservation economic development,16 but also the 
approach that does not work.17 Indeed, Cornell and Kalt identify federal 
control over economic decision-making as “the core problem in the 
standard approach to development and a primary hindrance to 
reservation prosperity.”18 In order to further successful tribal economic 
development, then, the federal government must make the difficult 
transition from decision-maker to advisor, from controlling the process to 
providing information and technical assistance and serving as a resource 
for tribes.19 
The history of tribal mineral development laws and practice 
demonstrates a trend toward increasing political and practical 
sovereignty. With the advent of the push for tribal self-determination in 
the 1970s, tribes asserted the right to a more significant say—greater 
practical sovereignty—in the development of their resources. Congress, 
in turn, has enacted resource statutes that increased tribal political 
sovereignty over resource decisions and decreased the control of the 
federal government. 
One of the earliest and most far-reaching of Congress’s efforts was 
Public Law 93-638, the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act of 1974.20 Under P.L. 638, tribes may enter into contracts 
and self-governance compacts to assume administration of federal Indian 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs/documents/WhatDeterminesIndianEcon
omicSuccess.pdf. 
14 Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 11, at 14. 
15 Cornell & Kalt, Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 15. 
16 Id. at 35. 
17 See generally Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 11. 
18 Id. at 18. 
19 Cornell & Kalt, Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 15; Cornell & Kalt, Two 
Approaches, supra note 11, at 18. See also Raymond Cross, De-Federalizing American 
Indian Commerce: Toward a New Political Economy for Indian Country, 16 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 445, 485 (1993) (arguing that “[s]uccessful tribal governments” should be 
able to manage their own resources and property, allowing the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs to “become a true service bureau” rather than the primary manager of tribal 
resources). 
20 88 Stat. 2203–17 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). 
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programs,21 and may use the 638 program to gain significant control over 
natural resources development. For example, a statistical analysis of 
seventy-five forestry tribes showed that in the 1980s, forty-nine of the 
tribes used the 638 program to take some degree of management over 
their forest resources.22 The study concluded that “tribal control of 
forestry under PL 638 results in significantly better timber management.” 
When tribes took complete management over their forest resources 
under 638, output rose as much as forty percent with no increase in the 
number of workers, and the tribes received prices as much as six percent 
higher than they had when the forest resources were managed by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.23 Despite this type of success, the 638 program 
has been criticized as a half-measure. Although it pushes tribes away from 
the federal control model,24 and authorizes tribes to administer federal 
programs, it “does not give tribes a major role in determining what the 
programs look like or whether the policies that drive those programs are 
appropriate.”25 Tribal control of federal programs is thus better than 
federal control, but a clear second-best to tribal choices of what programs 
and development opportunities to pursue. 
The surest way for tribes to control natural resources development, 
of course, is to develop the resources as a tribal enterprise.26 But while 
some tribes do engage directly in mineral production,27 as well as other 
21 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 22.02 (LexisNexis 2005) 
(1941). 
22 Matthew B. Krepps, Can Tribes Manage Their Own Resources? The 638 Program 
and American Indian Forestry, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO?, supra note 1, at 179, 182. The 
National Indian Forest Resources Management Act of 1990 specifically preserves and 
authorizes the use of contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with tribes for the 
management of forest resources. See 25 U.S.C. § 3104(a) (2000). The American 
Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act, enacted the same year, similarly 
authorizes tribes to use 638 contracts or self-governance compacts to develop and 
implement agricultural resource management plans. 25 U.S.C. § 3711(b)(1) (2000). 
23 Krepps, supra note 22, at 183. 
24 Cornell & Kalt, Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 36. 
25 Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 11, at 9. See also George S. Esber, 
Jr., Shortcomings of the Indian Self-Determination Policy, in STATE AND RESERVATION: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 212, 221 (George Pierre Castile & Robert L. 
Bee eds., 1992) (“The Indian Self Determination Act is not a self-determination 
policy but an invitation to participate.”). 
26 Despite tribal control when tribes are the developers, the Harvard Project 
notes that “both inside and outside Indian Country, it is difficult to make government 
ownership of business work,” citing problems with motivating top management and 
“separation of politics from day-to-day business management.” Cornell & Kalt, 
Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
27 For example, the Colorado River Indian Tribes’ sand and gravel operation 
produces materials for highway and construction projects. See Colorado River Indian 
Tribes, Business Opportunities, http://critonline.com/crit_contents/business. The 
Southern Ute Tribe has an oil and gas operating company that produces natural gas 
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resource development activities,28 most large-scale mineral development 
is still the province of non-Indian companies that enter into leases or 
other agreements with Indian tribes. The remainder of this Article will 
therefore concentrate on the federal mineral development statutes and 
the tribes’ exercise of political and practical sovereignty over those 
resources. 
III. THE TRAJECTORY OF TRIBAL SAY IN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT 
The three major natural resources traditionally subject to leasing are 
agricultural and grazing lands, forests, and minerals. Each has been 
subject to federal statutes that follow a similar arc—comprehensive 
federal control and exploitation during the allotment period; a slight 
loosening of federal control, tribal consent, and concern with tribal 
revenue streams in the reorganization period; and new approaches 
focusing more on tribal participation, partnerships, and increased 
control during the modern era of self-determination.29 This Section will 
focus on the trajectory of federal laws promoting mineral development 
on Indian lands. 
A. The Federal Government as Decision Maker 
1. The Allotment Era Jumble 
Widespread leasing of minerals, like leasing of other resources, 
began in the allotment era30 under the rubric that Indian lands should 
from hundreds of on-reservation wells. Thomas H. Shipps, Tribal Energy Resource 
Agreements: A Step Toward Self-Determination, NAT. RES. & ENVT., Summer 2007, at 55, 56. 
28 Tribes operate tribal farms, keep tribal herds, and manage tribal forest 
industries. As examples, at least half a dozen Arizona tribes engage in large-scale 
farming, see Tribal Farms are a Growing Part of Arizona Agricultural Economy, NEWS FROM 
INDIAN COUNTRY, Aug. 2007, available at http://indiancountrynews.net/index. 
php?option’com_content&task’view&id’1197&Itemid’84; the Colorado River Indian 
Tribes’ CRIT Farms alone manages over 15,000 acres of croplands. See Colorado River 
Indian Tribes, supra note 27. The InterTribal Bison Cooperative has 57 member 
tribes in 19 states; collectively, the tribes manage herds totaling over 15,000 buffalo. 
See InterTribal Bison Cooperative, Who We Are, www.itbcbison.com/about.php; 
Douglas H. Chadwick, Where the Buffalo Now Roam, DEFENDERS, Fall 2006, available at 
www.defenders.org/newsroom/defenders_magazine/fall_2006. Menominee Tribal 
Enterprises, the business arm of the Menominee Tribe in Wisconsin, manages the 
forest resources of the reservation for timber production and reforestation, including 
operation of the tribe’s sawmill. See Sustainable Development Institute, Menominee 
Forest, www.sustainabledevelopmentinstitute.org/ SustainingtheForest/Menominee 
TribalEnterprises.asp. 
29 For a more detailed look at the history of resource development statutes, see 
COHEN, supra note 21, at § 17; Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: 
The Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541 (1994). 
30 The allotment era of federal Indian law and policy ran from approximately 
1871 to 1934. See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 
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be made productive. The first general authorization for leasing of Indian 
lands was an 1891 statute authorizing tribal councils to issue grazing and 
mining leases.31 Mineral leasing was expanded in a series of acts in the 
1910s and 1920s. Some of these later statutes required tribal consent; 
some did not.32 All of them expanded the term of mineral leases from 
the 1891 ten-year maximum, although not in a consistent manner.33 And 
all of them authorized state taxation on production 34
The allotment years were thus a period during which the federal 
government first authorized, and then expanded, the availability of 
Indian mineral resources for development by non-Indians. After a 
cautious beginning in 1891, statute after statute opened more lands and 
more resources. The statutes were a jumble of requirements, however. 
Lease durations were not uniform; tribal consent was not always required; 
and state taxation was often permitted. Regardless of the specifics, 
however, the federal government was entirely in charge—of what 
resources could be developed, for what length of time, and under what 
circumstances. In most cases, tribes could consent to non-Indian 
development, but had little control otherwise over the management and 
development of their natural resources. 
2. The Reorganization Era Consolidation 
With the onset of the reorganization era,35 Congress responded to 
problems with allotment era leasing statutes and practices. The Indian 
(1995). In addition to the statutes discussed in the text, timber sales on Indian forest 
lands were also first authorized during this era, in 1910. 25 U.S.C. § 407 (2000). 
31 25 U.S.C. § 397 (2000). The act authorized leases on reservation lands “bought 
and paid for” that were not needed for agricultural purposes or allotments. The U.S. 
Supreme Court interpreted “bought and paid for” to mean lands set aside by treaty or 
agreement, but not by executive order. See British-American Oil Prod. Co. v. Bd. of 
Equalization, 299 U.S. 159, 164 (1936). The act required secretarial consent and 
limited leases to five years for grazing and ten years for mining. Agricultural leases for 
five-year terms were first authorized on the same basis in 1894, 25 U.S.C. § 402 
(2000), with the term extended to ten years for irrigable lands in 1926. 25 U.S.C. 
§ 402a. 
32 Tribal consent was not required by the act of 1919, amended in 1926, 
authorizing leases in nine western states for minerals other than oil and gas. 25 U.S.C. 
§ 399 (2000). Oil and gas leasing statutes in 1924 and 1927 did require tribal consent. 
25 U.S.C. §§ 398–398a (2000). 
33 The act of 1919, amended in 1926, authorized twenty year leases for resources 
other than oil and gas. 25 U.S.C. § 399. The acts of 1924 and 1927 lengthened the oil 
and gas lease term to ten years and “as much longer as oil or gas shall be found in 
paying quantities.” 25 U.S.C. §§ 398–398a. 
34 25 U.S.C. §§ 398–399. The oil and gas leasing statutes of 1924 and 1927 further 
directed that the state production taxes could be levied against Indian royalties. 25 
U.S.C. §§ 398, 398c. 
35 The reorganization era of federal Indian law and policy was ushered in 
formally by the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 985, codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 464–479. Reorganization repudiated the allotment and 
assimilation approach of the previous decades, and focused on the revitalization of 
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Reorganization Act itself addressed general leasing authority, while a 
separate reorganization era statute made major changes in the way 
mineral leasing was conducted. Although these statutes attempted to 
correct prior abuses and provide a measure of authority to Indian tribes, 
federal management and control remained the norm for resource 
development. 
The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), the cornerstone 
legislation of the reorganization era, authorized Indian tribes to form 
IRA constitutional governments and receive federal charters of 
incorporation. For those tribes that elected the IRA,36 IRA constitutions 
included a provision that tribal consent was required for the lease or 
encumbrance of tribal lands,37 and tribal business councils operating 
under IRA charters of incorporation were authorized to manage tribal 
property, including the authority to enter into leases of up to ten years 
without secretarial approval.38 
Mining was not specifically mentioned in the IRA, but in 1938 
Congress enacted the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA),39 intended in 
part to help achieve the IRA goal of revitalizing tribal governments.40 The 
IMLA substituted a single set of mineral leasing procedures for the 
allotment era jumble. All new mineral leases of tribal lands required both 
tribal consent and secretarial approval, and all new leases would issue for 
a term of ten years and “as long thereafter as minerals are produced in 
paying quantities.”41 To ensure that tribes received “the greatest return” 
on their minerals,42 regulations established a system of payments with 
minimum rates for rents and royalties.43 The IMLA was silent on state 
taxation, but the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently interpreted it as 
disallowing the practice of deducting state taxes from Indian royalty 
payments.44 
The reorganization era was thus a time of consolidating and 
streamlining federal mineral leasing statutes. In keeping with the federal 
tribal governments. See generally GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN 
INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 1934–
1945 (1980). 
36 See COHEN, supra note 21, at § 1.05. 
37 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000). 
38 Id. § 477; see also 25 C.F.R. § 84.004(b),(f)(2008). The term was extended from 
ten years to 25 years in 1990. Act of May 24, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-301, § 3(c)(3), 104 
Stat. 206 (1990). 
39 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a–396g (2000). 
40 S. REP. NO. 75-985, at 2–3; H.R. REP. NO. 75-1872, at 1–3. 
41 25 U.S.C. § 396a. 
42 S. REP. NO. 75-985, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 75-1872, at 2. 
43 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.20, 211.41–211.43 (2008). 
44 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 768 (1985). A few years later, 
however, the Court held that neither the IMLA nor general principles of Indian law 
preemption prevented states from taxing non-Indian mineral producers directly. 
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176–87 (1989). 
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policy focus on the revitalization of tribal governments, tribal consent was 
uniformly required for resource development, and Congress paid more 
attention to tribal revenues from mining activities. Nonetheless, tribes 
had more authority over resource development on paper than in 
practice.45 IRA corporations could enter freely into leases, but the ten-
year maximum lease term curtailed any real utility for mineral 
development. Leasing was the sole route for mineral development by 
non-Indians, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) set standard lease 
terms and developed standard lease forms. Mineral leases were essentially 
perpetual once minerals were produced in paying quantities, preventing 
tribes from renegotiating more favorable terms as conditions changed. 
Royalty rates were low, and industry often nominated tracts for sale, 
reducing the tribal role to simple consent. And federal surveys of Indian 
lands were generally lacking, leaving tribes with little real information 
about their natural resources before entering into leases.46 In the 
reorganization era, therefore, political sovereignty was minimal and the 
federal government retained most of the practical decision-making about 
Indian natural resources development and use. 
B. Increasing Practical and Political Sovereignty: The IMDA 
The 1970s ushered in a new federal Indian policy, one of tribal self-
determination.47 In this era, Congress enacted new measures for mining 
on tribal lands, providing for greater tribal participation in resource use 
and development. The legislative push under the self-determination 
policy began in earnest in the mid-1970s. The Indian Financing Act of 
1974 called for tribes to “fully exercise responsibility for the utilization 
and management of their own resources.”48 The Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 called for “a 
meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly 
transition from the Federal domination of programs for, and services to, 
Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in 
the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and 
services.”49 Viewed through this new lens of tribal self-determination and 
management of resources,50 the resource statutes of the reorganization 
years were woefully out of sync. 
45 Because “salvaging Indian economies” was a priority in the reorganization era, 
BIA officials believed that “that task required the continuation of maximum 
administrative control over Indian resources.” TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 93. 
46 See MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON BONDS: INDIAN CONTROL OF ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT 56 (1990). 
47 See generally COHEN, supra note 21, at § 1.07. 
48 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000). 
49 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (2000). 
50 See Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983). As a means to 
reduce tribal dependence on federal funding, President Reagan pledged that his 
administration would “assist tribes in strengthening their governments by removing 
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Agitation for change struck in the mining arena. Not only did the 
new policy of self-determination highlight the essentially passive role 
assigned to tribes under the 1938 IMLA, but the energy boom of the 
1970s left tribes with an ever smaller fraction of their resources’ value.51 
Western energy tribes, at least those not already bound to long-term 
leases under the IMLA or earlier statutes, tried several strategies. One was 
a moratorium on new mineral development called by several tribes while 
they engaged in careful planning for development.52 A second was 
formation of the Council of Energy Resources Tribes as a means of 
providing energy tribes with information, advice, and technical 
assistance.53 A third was the negotiation of mineral development 
agreements with energy companies. Relying on statutory authority to 
enter into service contracts “relative to their lands,”54 several tribes 
bypassed the restrictive provisions of the IMLA and entered into 
negotiated agreements that provided more tribal decision-making 
authority and greater tribal profits.55 The Secretary of the Interior 
initially approved several of these agreements, but determined in 1980 
that the department did not have the authority to approve an oil and gas 
agreement.56 The result was to call into question the legitimacy of the 
existing approved agreements. But energy tribes had begun to exercise 
practical sovereignty over their mineral resources, and there was no 
going back. 
Congress responded with an exercise of political sovereignty: the 
Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA) of 1982.57 The IMDA’s goals 
were “first, to further the policy of self-determination and second, to 
maximize the financial return tribes can expect for their valuable mineral 
resources.”58 Under the IMDA, all tribes were authorized to enter into 
minerals agreements of any kind, including “any joint venture, operating, 
production sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement . . . .”59 
the Federal impediments to tribal self-government and tribal resource development.” 
Id. at 97. He further stated that “Tribal governments have the responsibility to 
determine the extent and the methods of developing the tribe’s natural resources.” 
Id. at 98. 
51 For example, many coal leases set a flat royalty rate of 17.5 cents per ton. 
When the price of coal increased by 237 percent from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the 
average royalty per ton increased by only thirty-five percent. AMBLER, supra note 46, at 
66. 
52 Id. at 62, 72. 
53 Id. at 91–117. 
54 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2000). 
55 Royster, supra note 29, at 583–84. 
56 AMBLER, supra note 46, at 87. 
57 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2000). The IMDA directed the Secretary to review 
agreements approved in the 1970s, and take any steps necessary to bring them into 
compliance with the IMDA. Id. § 2104(a). 
58 S. REP. NO. 97-472, at 2 (1982). 
59 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a). 
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Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior,60 a tribe could 
choose what degree of control it wished to exercise, and what degree of 
risk it was willing to take, by its method of structuring an agreement.61 
Moreover, the statute obligated the Secretary, upon the request of the 
tribe and “to the extent of his available resources,” to provide advice, 
assistance, and information to tribes during the minerals agreements 
negotiations.62 The IMDA was thus a significant leap: not only were tribes 
authorized for the first time to directly negotiate the terms of their 
mineral development, but they were also authorized to move beyond 
leases into any type of arrangement they found beneficial. 
The exercise of practical sovereignty under the IMDA, however, had 
certain drawbacks for tribes. A depressed energy market in the 1980s, a 
lack of information and expertise with which to negotiate, and the 
potential financial risk sometimes made IMLA leases more attractive to 
tribes than the uncertainties of IMDA agreements.63 Nonetheless, IMDA 
agreements appear to have been early and widely adopted.64 
The IMDA, like the self-determination era statutes for resource 
development generally,65 represented a substantial increase in political 
sovereignty. Congress opened up options for tribes that wished to take 
advantage of them, and took important preliminary steps toward the 
Secretary’s transition from decision-maker to advisor. The political 
sovereignty instituted by a change in federal Indian policy was 
accompanied by the practical sovereignty of tribes choosing to take 
advantage of the new statutory opportunities. 
Little, if any, research appears to exist on whether these practical 
exercises of sovereignty are working well for the tribes that choose them, 
but there are indicators. The 1980s study of tribes that chose to take 
control of forest management under the 638 program concluded that 
tribes provided significantly better management, resulting in higher 
60 Id. 
61 Royster, supra note 29, at 586–87. 
62 25 U.S.C. § 2106. 
63 The IMDA preserved tribes’ ability to use the 1938 IMLA if they chose, as well 
as the leasing rights of IRA tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 2105 (2000). 
64 AMBLER, supra note 46, at 241–43. 
65 Congress did not address increased tribal authority over farming, range, and 
forest resources until 1990. When it did, Congress took a somewhat different 
approach than it had to mineral resources, focusing on tribal resource and 
management plans and the development of tribal law, as well as federally-approved 
sales and leases. In 1990, Congress enacted both the American Indian Agricultural 
Resource Management Act (AIARMA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3745 (2000), and the 
National Indian Forest Resources Management Act (NIFRMA), id. §§ 3101–3120. 
Both statutes call for increased tribal participation in management of the resources; 
state that the Secretary’s participation in management should be consistent not only 
with federal trust responsibilities, but also with tribal objectives; and provide training 
and education opportunities for tribal members. 
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output and increased prices.66 As to minerals specifically, there has been 
only a single reported court case under the 1982 IMDA, and that was 
resolved in 1986.67 It is certainly possible, indeed likely, that the lack of 
litigation concerning IMDA minerals agreements means that the IMDA is 
working well as a form of both political and practical sovereignty for 
tribes.68 
C. The Next Generation Approach To Resource Development 
Despite the substantial practical sovereignty embodied in the IMDA, 
that statute, like all the leasing acts that preceded it, required the 
cumbersome process of secretarial approval of each specific lease or 
agreement.69 Secretarial approval of development instruments traces 
back to the Nonintercourse Act, first enacted by the first Congress in 
1790, and unchanged since 1834. The Nonintercourse Act provides that 
no lease or other encumbrance of Indian land is valid under United 
States law without the consent of the federal government.70 In 1871, at 
the onset of the allotment period of federal Indian policy, Congress 
provided that any contract or agreement with an Indian tribe for the 
provision of services “relative to their lands” must be approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior,71 and it incorporated the approval requirement 
into subsequent mineral development statutes as well.72 
66 Krepps, supra note 22, at 183. See the discussion supra at text accompanying 
notes 22–23. 
67 Quantum Exploration, Inc. v. Clark, 780 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986). Quantum 
Exploration sought to bind the Blackfeet Indian Tribe to a minerals agreement, 
arguing that the tribe did not have the right to rescind the agreement prior to the 
Secretary’s approval, and that the BIA should not have provided the tribe with advice 
about problems with the agreement. The court easily rejected both arguments, 
concluding that both the tribe and the federal government were acting well within 
the IMDA. 
68 See David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from 
Itself? Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 
173, 191 (2004) (noting that “[t]he many unremarkably normal events are left 
unreported.”). 
69 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 8 (written testimony of Chairman 
Marcus D. Well, Jr., for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation) 
(noting that secretarial approval of the tribe’s IMDA agreements took “over three 
years”); id. at 18 (testimony of Chairman Carl Venne, Crow Nation) (noting “an 
extremely slow BIA approval process”). 
70 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000). 
71 Id. § 81. An amendment in 2000 removed the phrase “relative to their lands,” 
and provided instead that any “agreement or contract with an Indian tribe that 
encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or more years” requires secretarial 
approval. See Act of Mar. 14, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-179, § 2, 114 Stat. 46 (2000). 
72 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 396a (2000) (Indian Mineral Leasing Act); 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2102(a) (2000) (Indian Mineral Development Act). 
 1078 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:4 
 
Since 1934, Congress has occasionally granted exceptions to the 
Nonintercourse Act requirement of federal approval for every instrument 
encumbering of Indian lands. As already noted, tribal corporations 
chartered under § 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act may be 
empowered to “manage, operate, and dispose of property,” although 
their leasing authority is time-limited.73 Originally, IRA corporations were 
authorized to issue leases for up to ten-year terms, but in 1990 Congress 
extended that authority to twenty-five years.74 Similarly, in 2000 Congress 
amended the 1871 general statute addressing contracts and agreements 
with Indian tribes to provide that agreements and contracts that 
encumber Indian lands for a period of less than seven years do not 
require secretarial approval.75 
Although these provisions place significant independent decision-
making with tribes, the short-term leasing authority has not been overly 
useful for the economic development of tribal mineral resources. First, it 
appears that less than a third of all federally recognized tribes has a 
federal corporate charter.76 Most tribes, therefore, are likely unable to 
take advantage of the IRA provision for leasing without secretarial 
approval. Moreover, non-Indian companies entering into mineral leases 
or agreements are unlikely to accept terms that extend for only seven to 
ten years. Even though both the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 193877 
and the Indian Mineral Development Act of 198278 preserve the leasing 
rights of IRA corporations, the IRA is little used for mining purposes.79 
By the time a mining company engages in exploration and development 
activities, production will often just reach economic feasibility in ten 
73 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000). 
74 Pub. L. No. 101-301, § 3(c), 104 Stat. 207 (1990). 
75 25 U.S.C. § 81(b); see also 25 C.F.R. § 84.003 (2008). The legislative history of 
the amendment notes that § 81 was “concerned primarily with federal control” over 
agreements between tribes and non-Indians, but that “[o]ver the decades many 
provisions of this law have come to be antiquated and unnecessary.” H.R. REP. NO. 
106-501, reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 69. 
76 In 2007, there were 561 federally recognized tribes. See Indian Entities 
Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, 72 Fed. Reg. 13,648 (Mar. 22, 2007). At least 157 Indian tribes, including 
sixty-six in Alaska, have corporate charters, although the information at the website 
visited seems limited largely to those charters issued in the 1930s and 1940s. See Univ. 
of Okla. Law Ctr., Indian Reorganization Act Era Constitutions and Charters, 
http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA.html. 
77 25 U.S.C. § 396b. 
78 The IMDA, 25 U.S.C. § 2105, provides that leasing rights under the IMLA 
remain unaffected, and the IMLA preserves the right of IRA tribes to lease under 
their corporate charters. 25 U.S.C § 396b. 
79 See To Permit Indian Tribes to Enter into Certain Agreements for the Disposition of 
Tribal Mineral Resources: Hearings on S. 1894 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 62–63 (1982) (statement of Joe McKay, Member, Blackfeet Tribe 
of Montana). 
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years’ time.80 The 1990 extension of IRA corporate leasing to twenty-five 
year terms might have resulted in greater use of IRA leases, but by the 
time that extension was enacted, many tribes with mineral resources had 
moved away from leases to the more flexible arrangements authorized by 
the 1982 IMDA. 
Early in the self-determination era, Congress began to experiment 
cautiously with a new approach, one that eliminated secretarial approval 
of specific leases if the leases were issued in accordance with Interior-
approved tribal regulations. In each instance, the legislative history 
declares that the new approach is intended to further tribal 
independence in development decisions. 
In 1970, Congress amended the general surface leasing statute, 
known as § 415,81 to authorize the Tulalip Tribes to issue surface leases 
that do not involve “the exploitation of any natural resource” for up to 
fifteen years, or for certain longer periods if the lease is executed under 
tribal regulations approved by the Secretary.82 Specific leases that comply 
with these requirements do not require secretarial approval. The 
Department of the Interior, in support of the legislation, noted that the 
tribes wished to remove federal restrictions that they viewed as “an 
impediment to tribal progress.”83 
Thirty years later, Congress again amended 25 U.S.C. § 415 to 
provide a broader authorization to the Navajo Nation.84 In 2000, at the 
urging of the tribe,85 Congress authorized the Navajo Nation to issue 
business and agricultural leases for up to twenty-five years and other 
surface leases for up to seventy-five years if the lease is executed under 
tribal regulations approved by the Secretary.86 The Secretary is directed 
80 See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432, 1433–34 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (noting that the company spent nearly six years in exploration and related 
activities before submitting a mining plan). In recognition of this, the standard 
Indian mineral lease term is ten years and as long thereafter as the minerals are 
produced in paying quantities. 
81 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2000). Surface leases under § 415 may include “the 
development or utilization of natural resources in connection with operations under 
such leases.” Id. § 415(a). 
82 25 U.S.C. § 415(b). Subsection (b) was created by Act of June 2, 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-274, § 3, 84 Stat. 301, 302 (1970), and amended by Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 122, 
100 Stat. 1783 (1986). 
83 S. REP. No. 91-773, at 3239 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3237. The 
legislative history reveals, however, that the federal government was concerned with 
far more than supporting tribal decision-making. Congress noted that the tribal lands 
were “strategically located” close to downtown Seattle, and suited for “high-quality 
residential, industrial, and recreational purposes.” Id. at 3237–38. 
84 The Navajo Nation is not an IRA tribe; it has neither an IRA constitution nor 
an IRA corporate charter. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 198 
(1985). 
85 See Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 317, 361 (2006). 
86 25 U.S.C. § 415(e). 
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to approve tribal regulations if the regulations are consistent with 
Interior regulations for surface leasing and “provide for an 
environmental review process.”87 As with the Tulalip provision, specific 
leases that comply with the special statutory requirements do not require 
secretarial approval. Congress specified, however, that the authorization 
did not extend to any lease for “the exploration, development, or 
extraction of any mineral resources.”88 In enacting the statute, Congress 
expressly found that one purpose was to “revitalize” the Navajo Nation 
“by promoting political self-determination, and encouraging
sufficiency.”89 
In 2005, Congress expanded the new approach dramatically, 
reaching well beyond specific tribes. As part of the massive Energy Policy 
Act, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-
Determination Act (ITEDSA),90 which has the potential to
ext Generation Mineral Statute: ITEDSA 
ITEDSA authorizes Indian tribes, at their option, to enter into tribal 
energy resource agreements (TERAs) with the Department of the 
Interior.91 The Secretary is mandated to approve a TERA if the proposed 
agreement complies with a slew of statutory requirements, foremost 
among which is that the tribe demonstrate “sufficient capacity to regulate 
the development” of the tribal resources.92 Once a tribe has an approved 
TERA, it is authorized to enter into leases and business agreements93 for 
energy resource development, and to grant rights of way for pipelines 
and electric transmission and distribution lines, without the approval of 
87 Id. § 415(e)(3). 
88 Id. § 415(e)(1). 
89 Omnibus Indian Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 106-568, § 1202(b)(3), 114 
Stat
gy Development and Self-Determination Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 12808 
(Ma
programs that the 
trib h
red into to or subject to administration under a TERA.” 25 
C.F
. 2868, 2934 (2000). 
90 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3506 (2000). 
91 Id. § 3504(e). This option became available on April 9, 2008, when the final 
federal regulations took effect. See Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the 
Indian Tribal Ener
rch 10, 2008). 
92 ITEDSA § 3504(e)(2)(B)–(D). The regulations require a tribe to demonstrate 
its capacity by describing its “ability to negotiate and enter into” development 
instruments, discussing the tribe’s costs and sources of revenue associated with those 
responsibilities, and describing any 638 contracts or environmental 
e as assumed under federal laws. 25 C.F.R. § 224.53(f) (2008). 
93 Business agreements are broadly defined to include “[a]ny permit, contract, 
joint venture, option, or other agreement that furthers any activity related to locating, 
producing, transporting, or marketing energy resources on tribal land,” as well as 
amendments, supplements, and modifications to such agreements, and “[a]ny other 
business agreement ente
.R. § 224.30 (2008). 
 2008] PRACTICAL SOVEREIGNTY 1081 
e need for secretarial approval of 
the s
ear or more 
from the pre-application consultation to an approved TERA. 
 
the Secretary.94 With the exception of oil and gas leases, which may be 
made for the standard term of ten years and as long thereafter as the oil 
or gas is produced in paying quantities, leases, business agreements, and 
rights of way may be made for terms not to exceed thirty years.95 Thus, 
unlike the IMDA and its predecessor mineral leasing statutes, all of which 
require secretarial approval for each lease or minerals agreement that a 
tribe enters into, ITEDSA abolishes th
pecific development instrument. 
The exercise of tribal self-governance under ITEDSA is still some 
time away. The final regulations went into effect on April 9, 2008.96 Any 
tribe that wishes to may then begin the TERA process.97 The first step is a 
pre-application consultation between the tribe and the Director of the 
Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development.98 Following that 
consultation, the tribe submits its application for a TERA, including the 
text of its proposed TERA.99 The Director determines if the application is 
complete and, if so, holds an application consultation meeting, intended 
to help the Director determine whether the tribe has the requisite energy 
resource development capacity.100 The tribe may then submit a final 
proposed TERA for approval.101 Once the final proposed TERA is 
received, the Secretary publishes notice in the Federal Register and 
requests public comment,102 and conducts a review under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to determine potential environmental 
impacts that might arise from the TERA.103Ultimately, the Secretary has 
270 days from submission of a final proposed TERA to approve it or not, 
and “shall” approve it if the TERA meets the statutory requirements and 
the tribe has demonstrated sufficient capacity.104 Even if the process 
moves smoothly and as swiftly as possible,105 it will easily be a y
94 ITEDSA §§ 3504(a)–(b). 
95 ITEDSA § 3504(a)(2)(B), (b)(2). Leases, agreements, and rights-of-way may be 
ren
earing, supra note 2, at 45 (statement of 
Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and Economic 
Development, Department of the Interior). 
riod under NEPA will run 
con
ewed at the discretion of the tribe. ITEDSA § 3504(c). 
96 See 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,808. 
97 By May 1, 2008, “[s]everal tribes” had already expressed interest in pursuing a 
TERA, and the Department of the Interior had convened a national meeting with 
interested tribes on April 29. See Oversight H
98 25 C.F.R. § 224.51 (2008). 
99 25 C.F.R. § 224.53 (2008). 
100 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.57–59 (2008). 
101 25 C.F.R. § 224.61 (2008). 
102 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.67–68 (2008). 
103 25 C.F.R. § 224.70 (2008). The public comment pe
currently with the public comment period on the TERA. 
104 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2); 25 C.F.R. § 224.71 (2008). 
105 The likelihood of a smooth and swift process is, of course, small. In the 2003 
hearing on ITEDSA, the Navajo Nation noted that, with respect to its special leasing 
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IV. CRITIQUES OF ITEDSA 
ITEDSA, as the most far-reaching of the next generation of 
development statutes, represents a significant step beyond the self-
determination era statutes of the 1980s and 1990s, toward increased 
political sovereignty and greater practical sovereignty. There is no 
question that ITEDSA opens new options for tribes, reduces the day-to-
day management role of the federal government, and places greater 
practical decision-making in the hands of energy tribes. It also 
streamlines the resource development process by eliminating the often 
time-consuming step of secretarial approval of specific instruments. As 
such, it may stand as a model for future resource development statutes. 
Nonetheless, ITEDSA has potential down sides and drawbacks, both 
small and large. Many of these were noted in the hearing held on earlier 
versions of the statute, but not addressed or corrected in the final 
enacted version. If ITEDSA represents the model of future resource 
development statutes, the concerns raised by ITEDSA may be instructive 
of ways to structure future statutes to reduce or eliminate problems. 
A. Energy Resources Limitation 
The first concern is the limitation on the resources to which ITEDSA 
applies. Enacted as an energy development measure as well as a tribal 
self-determination measure,106 ITEDSA does not apply to all tribal 
mineral resources. The statute itself contains no definition of energy 
resources, but the regulations define them as “both renewable and 
nonrenewable energy sources, including, but not limited to, natural gas, 
oil, uranium, coal, nuclear, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and 
hydrologic resources.”107 Tribes’ ability to exercise greater practical 
sovereignty over their mineral resources thus does not extend to such 
minerals as clay or sand and gravel. This artificial division of tribal 
mineral resources into energy and non-energy resources means that 
instruments for the development of non-energy minerals must still go 
through a secretarial review process even for tribes that enter into 
TERAs. Consigning sand and gravel development to a more onerous 
process than, say, uranium or coal development makes little sense. 
Amending ITEDSA to apply to the full range of mineral resources 
provisions under § 415, “it has taken several years to develop the regulations which 
have now been adopted by the Navajo Nation but have yet to be approved by the 
Secretary.” ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 109 (Navajo Nation Response to 
Questions on S. 424 and S. 522). 
106 See, e.g., ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 70 (statement of Sen. Daniel K. 
Inouye) (noting that the bill was “intended to provide support to tribal governments 
in the development of energy resources on Indian lands”); id. at 93 (statement of 
Sen. Craig Thomas) (“As Congress continues to develop a comprehensive energy bill, 
Indian resources should not be overlooked.”). 
107 25 C.F.R. § 224.30 (2008). 
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covered by the Indian Mineral Development Act108 would not only 
harmonize the two statutes, but ensure that tribes could address all their 
mineral resources in the same manner. 
B. Access to Financial, Technical, and Scientific Resources 
A second concern with ITEDSA is the availability of financial 
resources and technical and scientific expertise. Few tribes at present 
have the in-house geologists, engineers, hydrologists, and other experts, 
or the financial wherewithal to hire or train them, to provide the tribe 
with accurate and reliable information about its energy resources and the 
environmental and financial impacts of resource decisions. Building 
sufficient tribal capacity to regulate energy development is not merely a 
matter of tribal interest and determination, but first and foremost a need 
for “financial and technical resources” to ensure that tribes approach 
negotiations with energy companies on a level field.109 In the 
congressional hearing on ITEDSA’s predecessor bills, both tribal and 
environmental representatives stressed the need for “symmetry in 
capacity” between tribes and energy companies.110 
ITEDSA provides for Department of Interior grants and loans to 
Indian tribes and grants and technical assistance to multi-tribal 
environmental organizations, and Department of Energy grants and loan 
108 The statute defines mineral resources as “oil, gas, uranium, coal, geothermal, 
or other energy or nonenergy mineral resources.” 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a). The IMDA 
regulations are more detailed: “Minerals includes both metalliferous and non-
metalliferous minerals; all hydrocarbons, including oil and gas, coal and lignite of all 
ranks; geothermal resources; and includes but is not limited to, sand, gravel, pumice, 
cinders, granite, building stone, limestone, clay, silt, or any other energy or non-
energy mineral.” 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (2008) (leases) and 25 C.F.R. § 225.3 (2008) 
(minerals agreements). 
109 ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 125 (statement of A. David Lester, Director, 
Council of Energy Resource Tribes); see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 42 
(statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and 
Economic Development, Department of the Interior) (“if a tribe wants to take 
advantage of the opportunity to develop Tribal Energy Resource Agreements with the 
Department, we must ensure that the tribe has identified resources and land title 
information, and the technical and administrative capability to develop those 
resources”). 
110 ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 125 (statement of A. David Lester, Director, 
Council of Energy Resource Tribes); see also id. at 140 (email from Rebecca L. 
Adamson, President, First Nations), id. at 152 (statement of Sharon Buccino, Senior 
Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council). Another tribal representative 
specifically noted the need for adequate resources to support the “lengthy and costly” 
environmental review process mandated in TERAs. Id. at 120–21 (statement of 
Vernon Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River Indian 
Reservation). See also Gavin Clarkson, Wall Street Indians: Information Asymmetry and 
Barriers to Tribal Capital Market Access, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV., 943, 946 (2008) 
(discussing “information asymmetry” in the context of financial and business 
relationships). 
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guarantee programs.111 It further provides for Department of Interior 
grants to tribes for the development of energy resource inventories or 
energy resources, feasibility studies, tribal law and technical 
infrastructure for environmental protection, and employee training.112 
Either directly through the use of federal officials, or indirectly by 
providing the finances to hire outside experts, the Secretary is directed to 
“ensure, to the maximum extent practicable and to the extent of 
available resources, that on the request of an Indian tribe, the Indian 
tribe shall have available scientific and technical information and 
expertise, for use in the regulation, development, and management of 
energy resources of the Indian tribe on Indian land.”113 
Whether this mandate is sufficient to address the concerns expressed 
during the hearings is problematic. Certainly Congress intended that 
federal resources be made available to assist tribes in the technical, 
scientific, and management aspects of regulating the development of 
their energy resources. And as certainly, the department has been 
providing some significant assistance.114 But the “extent of available 
resources” at Interior is nonetheless unlikely to be adequate to meet the 
needs of all tribes that wish to take advantage of the TERA program.115 
111 25 U.S.C. § 3502 (2008). For recent descriptions of DOI and DOE financial 
and technical support, see Oversight Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Dr. Robert W. 
Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development, 
Department of the Interior and statement of Steven J. Morello, Director, Office of 
Indian Energy Policy and Programs, U.S. Department of Energy). 
112 25 U.S.C. § 3503(a)–(b). For recent information on DOI support, see Oversight 
Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of 
Indian Energy and Economic Development, Department of the Interior). 
113 25 U.S.C. § 3503(c). The provision is all but identical to one in the Indian 
Mineral Development Act. The IMDA provides that upon the request of a tribe and 
“to the extent of his available resources,” the Secretary should provide “advice, 
assistance, and information” during the negotiation process, either directly or 
indirectly through financial assistance. 25 U.S.C. § 2106. 
114 For example, the Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Energy and 
Economic Development, maintains the Division of Energy and Mineral Development 
(DEMD) in Denver. As described by the Chairman of the Crow Tribe, ADEMD is a 
group of geotechnical experts that has provided us with professional appraisals of our 
mineral assets, including coal, oil, natural gas, wind energy, and limestone. DEMD is 
staffed by experienced industry-based professionals who provide sound advice and 
counsel on energy and resource development as well as strategic business-decision 
making.” Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 16 (testimony of Chairman Carl Venne, 
Crow Nation); see also id. (statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of 
Indian Energy and Economic Development, Department of the Interior) (describing 
the work of the Office). Chairman Venne stated that the Crow Nation “would not be 
in a favorable position to engage in large scale industrial development without 
DEMD’s assistance,” and urged Congress to continue its support. Id. at 19. 
115 The lack of federal financial resources may have the unintended and 
unfortunate consequence of creating a haves-and-have-nots situation among energy 
tribes: those with sufficient internal resources being able to take advantage of the 
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Moreover, helping to ensure that tribes negotiate on a level field 
requires the Secretary to do more than provide assistance as requested 
and feasible. It also requires that the Secretary refrain from providing 
information to energy companies that is withheld from the tribes. In the 
egregious case of Navajo Nation coal leases in the 1980s, the Secretary of 
the Interior supplied crucial information to the coal company which he 
did not supply to the tribe.116 The coal company then used that 
information in negotiating a new royalty rate on coal leases, a royalty rate 
that ultimately cost the tribe some $600 million in lost revenues.117 
Despite the overt breach of a common-law trustee’s duties,118 the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that the Secretary’s action did not constitute a 
breach of trust under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act and its 
implementing regulations, and held therefore that the Navajo Nation 
could not recover for its losses under that statute.119 So long as the 
Secretary’s legal obligations to tribes do not prevent this type of dealing, 
tribes cannot be sure that the negotiating field is indeed level. 
The remaining concerns about ITEDSA and its approach focus on 
the extent to which the federal government still retains control, the 
extent to which tribal decision-making is constrained by federal law, or 
both. 
greater practical sovereignty that a TERA offers, and those without sufficient internal 
resources relegated to secretarial approval of every resource decision. 
116 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 497 (2003). 
117 Id. at 500. 
118 See Navajo Nation v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 236 (2000), rev’d, 263 F.3d 
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001), rev’d, 527 U.S. 488 (2003) (“The facts of this case show that the 
Secretary acted in the best interests of a third party and not in the interests of the 
beneficiary to whom he owed a fiduciary duty—a classic violation of common law 
fiduciary obligations.”). The Court of Federal Claims nonetheless ruled against the 
Navajo Nation on its breach of trust claim, finding that neither federal violations of 
“the most fundamental fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and candor,” id. at 227, nor 
anything in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act entitled the tribe to money damages on 
its royalty claim. Id. at 236, rev’d, 263 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 488 
(2003). 
119 Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 514. The case is on-going. On remand from the 
Supreme Court decision, the Navajo Nation asserted that a “network” of other 
authorities—including its treaties, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 
and the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act, among others—established a 
claim for money damages. The Court of Federal Claims ruled against the Nation, but 
the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the network of statutes and regulations 
“demonstrates that the government exercises comprehensive control over coal 
resource planning, coal mining operations, and coal royalty management and 
collection.” Navajo Nation v. United States, 501 F.3d 1327, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted, 2008 WL 2047578 (Oct. 1, 2008). 
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C. Public Input Into Tribal Decision-Making 
A substantial concern expressed in the legislative history is that 
ITEDSA provides multiple points for public input into tribal decision-
making concerning energy development. First, a proposed TERA is itself 
subject to public notice and comment,120 and the Secretary is required to 
take public comments into account in the decision whether to approve a 
TERA.121 In addition, TERA requirements include that the tribe must 
provide for public notice of final approvals of development 
instruments,122 and must establish an environmental review process to 
identify significant environmental effects and any proposed mitigation 
measures.123 As part of the environmental review process, the tribe must 
provide an opportunity for public notice and comment, respond to 
comments prior to approving an instrument, and provide a process for 
consultation with the state regarding any off-reservation impacts.124 And 
finally, any “interested party” may, after exhausting tribal remedies, 
petition the Secretary to review the tribe’s compliance with its TERA.125 
Many of the public input provisions of ITEDSA, although not 
necessarily all, conflict sharply with tribal self-governance. One tribe’s 
attorneys summed up the various public input requirements as “a trade-
off that may be unacceptable” to tribes that otherwise would take 
advantage of the TERA program: 
Essentially, the measures propose the elimination of Secretarial 
approval in exchange for the promulgation of tribal regulations 
that not only require consultation with State officials, but also 
require public notification and comment processes, and, ultimately, 
private citizen challenges of approved leases or rights-of-way based 
on allegations of non-compliance with tribal regulations. 
Traditional notions of tribal sovereignty would protect tribes against 
the incursion of State governments or the views of non-members in 
the process of tribal decision-making. To ask tribes to forsake such a 
fundamental aspect of sovereignty in exchange for the elimination 
of Secretarial approval, may simply be too much for most tribes. 126 
1. Public Notice and Comment On TERAs 
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to publish notice of a 
proposed TERA in the Federal Register for public comment and to 
conduct a review of the proposed TERA under NEPA, although 
regulations state that the public comment period under NEPA will run 
120 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(3) (2000). 
121 25 C.F.R. § 224.68 (2008). 
122 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(IX) (2000). 
123 Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C). 
124 Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(X), (C)(iii). 
125 Id. § 3504(e)(7). 
126 ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 159 (statement of Maynes, Bradford, Shipps 
& Sheffel, LLP, Attorneys for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe). 
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concurrently with the TERA comment period.127 Tribal representatives 
objected to this process, concerned about “subjecting internal tribal 
regulations to the public notice and comment process through the 
federal register.”128 
It is not entirely clear what role the public comments on proposed 
TERAs will play. As noted earlier, the regulations require the Secretary to 
take the public comments into account in determining whether to 
approve a proposed TERA,129 and indeed public comment would be a 
useless exercise otherwise. But ITEDSA also requires the Secretary to 
approve a proposed TERA if it meets the statutory requirements.130 In 
order to reconcile these provisions, it would seem that public comments, 
in order to be considered by the Secretary, must be restricted to whether 
a proposed TERA meets the statutory requirements.131 
The statutory requirements for approval of a TERA are multiple, but 
can be divided into three broad categories: first, a requirement that a 
TERA must include such provisions as setting forth the terms of the 
agreement, establishing an environmental review process, describing 
remedies for breach, and so forth;132 second, a requirement that a TERA 
must provide for periodic monitoring by the Department of the 
Interior;133 and third, a requirement that the Secretary determine “that 
the Indian tribe has demonstrated that the Indian tribe has sufficient 
capacity to regulate the development of energy resources of the Indian 
tribe.”134 Criteria for determining whether a tribe has demonstrated 
sufficient capacity include the scope of activities the tribe proposes to 
assume, the history of the tribe’s role in energy development, the tribe’s 
administrative capacity, its financial ability to obtain technical expertise, 
its past performance with contracts, grants, and leases, and “[a]ny other 
factors the Secretary finds to be relevant in light of the scope of the 
proposed TERA.”135 
127 25 C.F.R. § 224.70. 
128 ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 105 (statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, 
Navajo Nation). 
129 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.67–68 (2008). The regulations specifically provide that “[t]he 
Secretary will review and consider public comments in deciding whether to approve 
or disapprove the final proposed TERA.” § 224.68(a). 
130 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B); see also 25 C.F.R. § 224.71. 
131 If the Secretary were to take into account public comments that go beyond 
the statutory requirements for a TERA, that would introduce extra-statutory factors 
into the Secretary’s determination. It would also appear to violate the fundamental 
trust duties that the Secretary owes to Indian tribes. Congress has mandated approval 
of TERAs that meet certain statutory requirements, and for the Secretary to introduce 
such additional factors into the approval process as public comments may raise, 
would subordinate the beneficiary’s interests. 
132 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii). 
133 Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(ii), (e)(2)(D). 
134 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(i); see also 25 C.F.R. § 224.71. 
135 25 C.F.R. § 224.72 (2008). 
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This potentially opens up the realm of public comments. Since tribal 
capacity is a statutory requirement, and since the Department of the 
Interior has given itself the authority to consider any other (relevant) 
factors in determining capacity, public comments are arguably 
appropriate on virtually any topic relating to tribal energy development. 
That, in turn, becomes an issue not only at the point of the Secretary’s 
decision on a TERA, but during the administrative appeals process136 and 
the judicial review process.137 Both the comments and the agency’s 
response form part of the administrative record if the Secretary’s 
decision to approve or disapprove a TERA is challenged in court.138 With 
all that, tribal fears of subjecting tribal regulations to public comment 
may well be justified. 
There are, however, important principles that both the Secretary and 
the reviewing court, if any, must take into account. First, ITEDSA 
confines the Secretary’s review of a proposed TERA “to activities specified 
by the provisions of the tribal energy resource agreement.”139 Moreover, 
Congress directed that the Secretary “act in accordance with the trust 
responsibility . . .[and] in good faith and in the best interests of the 
Indian tribes.”140 The Secretary of the Interior has announced specific 
trust principles for the interpretation and implementation of ITEDSA. 
Under the ITEDSA regulations: 
(a) The Secretary will interpret and implement [the statute 
and the regulations] in accordance with the self-determination and 
energy development provisions and policies in the Act. 
(b) The Secretary will liberally construe [the statute and the 
regulations] for the benefit of tribes to implement the Federal 
policy of self-determination. The Secretary will construe any 
ambiguities in [the statute or the regulations] in favor of the tribe 
to implement a TERA as authorized by [the statute and 
regulations]. 141 
These provisions obligate the Secretary, in considering the approval 
of a TERA, to place tribal self-determination at the core of the decision. 
Although the Secretary will consider and respond to relevant public 
comments on a proposed TERA, the Secretary should do so in light of 
136 ITEDSA establishes an administrative review process. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.180–
185 (2008). 
137 The Secretary’s approval of a TERA is a final agency action that can be 
challenged in court. 25 C.F.R. § 224.77 (2008) (stating that a TERA approval is a final 
agency action); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (providing that final agency actions are subject 
to judicial review). 
138 The only entity with the standing to appeal the Secretary’s decision to 
disapprove a TERA is the tribe that proposed it. 25 C.F.R. § 224.77. 
139 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(3)(2000). 
140 Id. § 3504(e)(6)(A). 
141 25 C.F.R. § 224.20 (2008). 
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the policies and regulations promoting tribal self-determination and 
energy development. 
A reviewing court should take the same approach. A basic canon of 
federal Indian law is that statutes such as ITEDSA “be liberally construed 
in favor of the Indians; and all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of 
the Indians.”142 Moreover, as just discussed, Congress was clear in ITEDSA 
itself that these principles apply. An equally basic principle of 
administrative law, the Chevron doctrine, is that federal reviewing courts 
should normally defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory language.143 Although there is some disagreement, 
the majority of federal courts that have addressed the interplay of the 
Indian law canons and the Chevron doctrine have concluded that if the 
two interpretive principles conflict, the Indian law canons—liberal 
construction in favor of tribal rights—trump the usual deference to 
agency decision-making.144 Thus, to the extent that there is ambiguity in 
ITEDSA concerning the Secretary’s use of public comments in the 
approval of TERAs, those ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the 
tribes. An agency interpretation that runs counter to the canons would 
violate not only the agency’s own rules, but the clearly expressed wishes 
of Congress as well, thus rendering the interpretation unreasonable. 
2. Environmental Review of Tribal Decisions 
ITEDSA requires that a TERA establish an environmental review 
process for tribal development instruments and provide public 
notification of final tribal approvals.145 Some tribal representatives 
objected to the environmental review process either on the basis of 
inadequate tribal financial resources to carry out environmental reviews, 
142 COHEN, supra note 21, at § 2.02[1] (footnote omitted). 
143 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). 
144 See COHEN, supra note 21, at § 2.02[3] (collecting cases). The interplay has 
been examined in the scholarly literature. See Scott C. Hall, The Indian Law Canons of 
Construction v. the Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous Answer to 
the Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN. L. REV. 495 (2004) (arguing that because 
congressional intent to diminish tribal rights must be clear, statutory ambiguities do 
not allow an agency to interpret the statute so as to diminish those rights, and the 
Indian law canons must therefore trump Chevron if the agency does so); Alex 
Tallchief Skibine, The Chevron Doctrine in Federal Indian Law and the Agencies’ Duty to 
Interpret Legislation in Favor of Indians: Did the EPA Reconcile the Two in Interpreting the 
“Tribes as States” Section of the Clean Water Act?, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 15 (1998) 
(arguing that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous Indian statute should be 
found permissible under Chevron only if the agency has applied the Indian canons of 
construction in reaching its interpretation). 
145 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C), (B)(iii)(IX) (2000). Although a tribe is required 
by ITEDSA to provide an environmental review process, including public notice and 
comment, it need not as a matter of federal law establish procedures for public input 
on non-environmental matters. 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.102–103 (2008). 
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or on the ground that the federal government should not mandate what 
tribal governments choose to do.146 
The structure of a tribal environmental review process under 
ITEDSA is set out in the statute.147 The tribal process must provide for 
the identification and evaluation of significant environmental effects of 
the proposed instrument, identify any mitigation measures and 
incorporate those that are appropriate, provide for public notice and 
comment as well as tribal response to substantive public comments prior 
to tribal approval of the instrument, provide for tribal technical and 
administrative capacity to carry out an environmental review, and provide 
a tribal environmental oversight process for TERA activities. This 
requirement is intended in large part to mirror the provisions of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).148 NEPA, which requires an 
environmental review process for major federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment, applies to federal 
approvals of tribal resource development leases and agreements.149 Once 
the Secretary no longer approves each instrument, however, NEPA does 
not apply to the tribe’s development decisions. 
There is no question that the environmental review process under a 
TERA will be costly, and it will undeniably have the potential to delay 
implementation of tribal resource decisions.150 Nonetheless, the TERA 
provisions for environmental review of specific tribal development 
146 ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 120 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, 
Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River Indian Reservation) (urging 
that the federal government should provide tribes the financial support to conduct 
environmental reviews), and 155 (statement of Howard D. Richards, Sr., Chairman, 
Southern Ute Indian Tribal Council) (arguing that no environmental review is 
required for energy development on neighboring private lands, and that “Congress 
should resist efforts designed to change tribal decision-making into public decision-
making.”). Comments from state government and environmental organization 
representatives, on the other hand, supported public involvement in the tribal 
environmental review process. Id. at 150 (statement of Sharon Buccino, Senior 
Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council), and 172 (statement of Bill 
Richardson, Governor, State of New Mexico). 
147 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C); see also 25 C.F.R. § 224.63(c) (2008). 
148 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 
(2000). The Secretary “agrees,” however, that the regulatory provisions for 
environmental review, consistent with the statutory language, “go beyond the 
requirements of NEPA.” Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,808, 12,814 
(Mar. 10, 2008). 
149 See Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972); see generally 1 WILLIAM H. 
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY §§ 1:14–1:26 (2005). 
150 And in that sense, ITEDSA does not streamline the process of energy 
development on tribal lands. 
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decisions are not necessarily incompatible with practical sovereignty.151 
First, like NEPA, the environmental review provisions of ITEDSA 
mandate a process rather than a substantive outcome.152 Tribes must 
identify and evaluate significant environmental effects, identify proposed 
mitigation measures, and include appropriate mitigation measures in 
specific instruments.153 Nothing in this process contemplates a particular 
substantive decision, but rather that decisions are made in light of full 
environmental information. The intent, as with NEPA, is that more 
information leads to more informed, and therefore “better,” decision 
making.154 
Second, public notice and comment on environmental matters has 
long been a feature of tribal mineral development decisions, by way of 
the NEPA process. Under current mineral development statutes other 
than ITEDSA—the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 and the 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938—the Secretary must approve each 
specific lease or development agreement. The Secretary’s approval, in 
turn, constitutes “major federal action,” which triggers the environmental 
review process of NEPA if the action significantly affects the quality of the 
human environment.155 Virtually all mineral development has significant 
enough effects to require an environmental impact statement.156 An 
environmental impact statement for tribal mineral development, whether 
undertaken by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or another federal agency,157 
is subject to public notice and comment in draft form,158 and the federal 
agency is required to consider and respond to substantive comments in 
preparing the final statement.159 
There are at least two important differences between public notice 
and comment as part of the NEPA process and as part of the TERA 
process. Like other aspects of the TERA environmental review process, 
151 It is true, however, that these requirements are imposed on tribes by federal 
law, and thus do not necessarily represent tribal choices concerning the balance 
between resource development and environmental protection. 
152 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) 
(“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary 
process.”). 
153 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C). 
154 See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, The Application of the National Environmental Policy Act 
to “Development” in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 377, 427 (1991) (noting that 
“tribes can use the NEPA process to reach better decisions, at least in the 
environmental sense.”). 
155 Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972). 
156 See National Environmental Policy Act: Implementing Procedures, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 67845, 67847 (Dec. 24, 1996) (listing certain mineral development projects as 
automatically requiring a full environmental impact statement without the 
preliminary screening stage of an environmental assessment). 
157 See COHEN, supra note 21, at § 10.08. 
158 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4)(2008). 
159 Id. § 1503.4. 
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the costs of notice and comment will be borne by the tribe rather than 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs or other federal governmental agency. This 
cost-shifting places a significant burden on the tribes. On the other hand, 
the consideration of and response to comments will be undertaken by 
the tribe rather than a federal agency. Although tribes have substantial 
input at the NEPA comment stage,160 the consideration of all comments 
and the response to them are matters for the federal agency. The shift to 
a tribal environmental review process ensures that comments will be 
reviewed in light of tribal values, priorities, and decisions, rather than 
filtered through a federal lens. 
Third, although the environmental review process introduces the 
requirement of public comment on the environmental effects of a 
proposed instrument, and the requirement that the tribe respond to 
relevant and substantive comments before it approves the instrument, 
this type of public participation can serve important tribal interests.161 
First, it allows input by tribal citizens; although tribal members have 
indirect influence through their voting powers for tribal government 
officials, public comment allows more direct participation in tribal 
government. In addition, the public comment provision allows 
nonmembers who may be affected by the tribe’s decisions an opportunity 
to have their say, and to have the tribe respond directly to their 
substantive environmental concerns. Not only does that address 
legitimate interests of reservation residents and neighbors who have no 
direct say in tribal government, but it helps alleviate the often still-
lingering perception that tribal governments are not responsive to valid 
non-tribal concerns.162 On the other hand, of course, there is little 
question that the public comment process also allows those who oppose 
or fear tribal actions generally to make their misgivings part of the 
record. Nonetheless, the values of public participation may outweigh the 
concerns those types of comments can pose. 
In addition, some tribes pursuing a TERA may already have a tribal 
environmental review process in place. Tribal environmental policy acts 
160 For example, NEPA regulations require a federal agency to request comments 
specifically from Indian tribes “when the effects may be on a reservation.” Id. 
§ 1503.1(a)(2)(ii). 
161 The advantages identified here build on the section “why public participation 
and due process matter” in Dean B. Suagee & John P. Lowndes, Due Process and Public 
Participation in Tribal Environmental Programs, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5–9 (1999). Suagee 
and Lowndes also note that tribes treated as states for purposes of federal 
environmental laws may also be subject to various public participation requirements. 
See id. at 25–32. 
162 See id. at 9(“Public perceptions of tribal governments are probably more 
important, pragmatically, than many tribal leaders and tribal attorneys would like to 
acknowledge.”). 
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(TEPAs) have long been advocated,163 and in 2000 the Tulalip Tribes 
published a guide for Indian tribes interested in developing TEPAs.164 
Tribes that have chosen to develop TEPAs generally cite the importance 
of “proper and meaningful consideration of environmental, cultural, 
historical, and ecological factors” before development occurs,165 and the 
need “to protect and preserve” the reservation and “to provide a safe and 
habitable homeland” for the generations.166 It is difficult to determine 
how many tribes have TEPAs currently in place,167 but of those tribal 
TEPAs readily available online, at least some provide either a public 
notice and comment process or some method of public participation in 
the environmental review process.168 Although those tribes have chosen 
to include public participation in the environmental review process, and 
tribes entering into TERAs are required by federal law to do so, there is 
163 See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee & Patrick A. Parenteau, Fashioning a Comprehensive 
Environmental Review Code for Tribal Governments: Institutions and Processes, 21 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 297, 299 (1997). 
164 GILLIAN MITTELSTAEDT, DEAN SUAGEE, & LIBBY HALPIN NELSON, PARTICIPATING 
IN THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: DEVELOPING A TRIBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE FOR AMERICAN INDIAN AND NATIVE ALASKAN 
COMMUNITIES (Tulalip Tribes 2000), available at http://nepa.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
ReNEPA/ReNEPA.nsf/All+Documents/C3A140A5BC48BC8D852570240073CFA3/$
FILE/TEPA.pdf. 
165 JICARILLA APACHE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TRIBAL CODE tit. 14, § 1, 
reprinted in Kathleen M. Sloan, Enhancing Cultural Resources Management and 
Improving Tribal Involvement in the NEPA Process Through the Development of a 
Tribal Environmental Policy Act 273, 277 app. (May 25, 2007) (Ph.D dissertation, 
Oregon State University), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1957/6149. 
166 Oglala Sioux Tribal Environmental Review Code (2002), available at 
http://narf.org/nill/Codes/oglalacode/oglalaenviro.htm. 
167 See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 165, at 212 (“While I have found a variety of 
environmental codes and ordinances, I have only located two actual copies of 
TEPAs.”). Dr. Sloan’s dissertation includes the two TEPAs that she located—for the 
Swinomish Tribe in Washington State and the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in New 
Mexico—as appendices. At least one other TEPA is available online: the Oglala Sioux 
Tribal Environmental Review Code, supra note 166. Others are referenced in 
documents, but not available online. See, e.g., Press Release, Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians to Redevelop Hotel (Dec. 
1, 2006), available at http://www.aguacaliente.org/GovernmentAffairsPress/tabid/ 
55/Default.aspx#redevelophotel (noting that the tribe “has filed formal paperwork 
under the Tribal Environmental Policy Act”). 
168 See, e.g., Swinomish Tribe Environmental Policy Act, §§ 19-01.130–19-01.150, 
reprinted in Sloan, supra note 165, at 270–72, App. B (providing for public notice and 
comment, public hearings “whenever appropriate,” and “meaningful reference” in 
the final review document to opposing views); see also Oglala Sioux Tribal 
Environmental Review Code, supra note 166, §§ 106–107 (providing that 
environmental review permits be made available for public inspection, and for an 
administrative review process for “[a]ny person aggrieved by an Environmental 
Review Permit being issued or denied”). 
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no indication that such provisions have proven problematic for the tribes 
that adopted them. 
One further aspect of the environmental review process under 
ITEDSA that was troubling to tribal representatives is the requirement 
for specific tribal consultation with state governments on off-reservation 
environmental impacts.169 State input into tribal decision-making raises 
the specter of historic interference by states with tribal matters,170 as well 
as the issue of a lack of symmetry. States are not required by federal law 
to consult with tribes concerning on-reservation environmental impacts 
of state development initiatives, and few states include a government-to-
government tribal consultation requirement as a matter of state 
environmental review law.171 In general, tribes are able to participate in 
state environmental reviews172 on the same basis as the public generally. 
State governments would have a similar right to participate in the public 
notice and comment phase of tribal environmental reviews under TERAs. 
Although specific government-to-government consultation on cross-
border environmental impacts is likely positive for both tribal and state 
interests, the asymmetry of requiring consultation only one way is 
169 See 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(X). 
170 See, e.g., ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 159 (statement of Maynes, Bradford, 
Shipps & Sheffel, LLP, Attorneys for the Southern Ute Tribe). Increasingly, however, 
states and tribes are moving toward intergovernmental cooperation in a number of 
areas. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State 
Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007). One significant difference in the types of 
situations chronicled by Professor Fletcher, of course, is the symmetry of the 
cooperation; ITEDSA mandates a one-way process. See id. at 74, 82–86. 
171 Even those provisions that do exist appear to be limited. See, e.g., S. B. 18, 2004 
Leg., 2003–2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (requiring city and county governments to consult 
with tribes for the protection of traditional tribal cultural places prior to making 
specific land use decisions); see also State of California, Governor’s Office of Planning 
and Research, Tribal Consultation Guidelines: Supplement to General Plan 
Guidelines 12 (Nov. 14, 2005), available at http://www.opr.ca.gov/index.php?a’ 
planning/publications.html#pubs-T. See also, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 540.530(1) 
(d)(A)(2007) (requiring tribal consultation if an in-stream water right would be 
injured by a proposed change of use, place of use, or point of diversion); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 90.82.080(3) (2004) (requiring “government-to-government consultation with 
affected tribes” before setting minimum instream flows). The state of Oregon 
requires that all state agencies “make a reasonable effort to cooperate with tribes in 
the development and implementation of programs of the state agency that affect 
tribes,” OR. REV. STAT. § 182.164(3)(2007). It also provides that nothing in that 
requirement “creates a right of action against a state agency or a right of review of an 
action of a state agency.” Id. § 182.168. 
172 Approximately 15 states have enacted state environmental policy acts (SEPAs) 
that require state or local agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their 
proposed activities. See Catherine J. LaCroix, SEPAs, Climate Change, and Corporate 
Responsibility: The Contribution of Local Government, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV.—n.18 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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troublesome.173 A better approach would allow tribes to choose whether 
to include state consultation as a category separate from public 
participation, perhaps conditioned on a reciprocal provision in state law. 
3. Interested Party Challenges 
The third area of concern in public input is the ITEDSA provision 
for “interested party” challenges to tribal compliance with TERAs.174 The 
federal statute defines an “interested party” as a person or entity that will 
sustain or has sustained an adverse environmental impact because the 
tribe failed to comply with its TERA.175 Any interested party may, after 
exhausting any available tribal remedies, petition the Secretary to review 
the tribe’s compliance with its TERA.176 After consultation with the tribe 
and opportunity for the tribe to respond, if the Secretary determines that 
the tribe is not in compliance, the Secretary may take such action as the 
Secretary deems to be necessary to ensure compliance.177 The ability of 
interested parties to challenge a tribe’s compliance with its TERA may 
prove to inject considerable delay and expense into tribal resource 
development. In particular, the potential for nuisance suits by 
disgruntled neighbors is certainly present. 
Although interested parties are required to exhaust any tribal 
remedies available before petitioning the Secretary, the regulations 
contain an odd provision that could discourage tribes from providing 
such remedies, or at least pose a potential roadblock to tribal remedies. 
The regulations provide that a tribe may resolve the party’s claims “with 
173 In Russel Barsh’s classic phrase, “Spillovers spill over both ways.” Russel 
Lawrence Barsh, Is There Any Indian “Law” Left? A Review of the Supreme Court’s 1982 
Term, 59 WASH. L. REV. 863, 875 (1984). 
174 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(7); see also 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.100–121 (2008). 
175 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(7)(A). Some commenters on the proposed rules 
indicated that the definition “unfairly limits the interests of parties that could appeal 
actions taken under a TERA.” Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 12808, 12812 
(Mar. 10, 2008). Interior declined to amend the regulatory definition because it 
tracks the statutory definition, but “recognize[d] the limitation of the definition.” Id. 
at 12812; see 25 C.F.R. § 224.30. The Department also noted that “there are other 
avenues for appeal of TERA approved actions,” directing readers to the final rules for 
appeals of Interior’s decisions. Id. The appeals procedures in turn specify that appeals 
may be taken by an adversely affected tribe, an adversely affected third party to a 
lease, agreement, or right-of-way entered into pursuant to a TERA, or an “interested 
party” under the statutory definition. See 25 C.F.R. § 224.181. The regulations are thus 
consistent with congressional intent that public challenges to TERA-approved 
instruments are limited to those alleging environmental injury in fact as a result of 
tribal non-compliance with the instrument. 
176 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(7)(B). Tribes are not required by ITEDSA to provide a 
tribal procedure for interested party challenges. See 25 C.F.R. § 224.104. If, however, 
the tribe provides a process, it must issue a final written decision within a “reasonable 
time” of receiving the interested party’s petition. Id. § 224.106. 
177 25 U.S.C. §§ 3504(e)(7)(C)–(D). 
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the petitioner’s written consent.”178 It is likely that this provision applies 
to a petition filed with the Secretary of the Interior after exhaustion of 
tribal remedies, and not to the interested party’s petition to the tribal 
court or administrative body. While that was quite clear in the proposed 
regulations, however, it is less clear in the final version. 
In the proposed regulations, the provision was placed immediately 
after the provision for an interested party to file a petition with the 
Secretary.179 The proposed regulation stated that: “If the tribe submits a 
proposed resolution and a written statement signed by the petitioner that 
shows the petitioner concurs with the tribe’s proposed resolution of the 
claim,” the department may accept the resolution and dismiss the 
petition.180 It was thus clear that the tribe and the petitioner could submit 
a resolution in which they both concurred after a petition was filed with 
the Secretary. Although it appears that Interior received no comments on 
the proposed provision,181 it reworded the provision and changed its 
place in the order of the provisions. The final provision is located 
immediately after a provision stating what a petitioner must do before 
filing a petition with the Secretary.182 Further, it states that the tribe may 
resolve the petitioner’s claims, “with the petitioner’s written consent,” 
when the tribe is “responding to a petition filed under tribal laws, 
regulations or procedures.”183 The regulations use the term “petition . . . 
under those tribal laws, regulations, or procedures” to describe a petition 
which is filed with the tribe itself in order to exhaust any available tribal 
remedies.184 It thus appears that Interior, acting on its own without 
explanation, has created a potentially serious problem. 
Read literally, the current provision appears to state that a petitioner 
must consent in writing to any resolution offered through the tribal 
administrative or judicial process. If the regulation is interpreted in that 
manner, however, it would effectively nullify any tribal process. If an 
interested party is unsatisfied with the outcome of any tribal process, the 
party has the right to file a petition with the Secretary. If an interested 
party is satisfied with the outcome of the tribal process, or not sufficiently 
unsatisfied to pursue further remedies, then the tribal resolution of the 
matter should stand without more. Anything else makes a mockery of the 
tribal remedies. 
178 25 C.F.R. § 224.108. 
179 See Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian Tribal Energy 
Development and Self-Determination Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 48,626, 48,639 (proposed 
Aug. 21, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 224.114). 
180 Id. at 48,640. 
181 See Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian Tribal Energy 
Development and Self-Determination Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,808, 12,817 (March 10, 
2008) (showing no response to any commentary on 25 C.F.R. § 224.108). 
182 See 25 C.F.R. § 224.107. 
183 Id. § 224.108. 
184 See id. §§ 224.105(b), 224.106(c). 
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In order to remain consistent with the purposes of ITEDSA and the 
Secretary’s rules for carrying out ITEDSA185—the promotion of tribal self-
government and the economic development of tribal energy resources—
the provision must be interpreted as it was understood from the 
proposed rules. The final rules provide that, in responding to a petition 
filed with the Secretary, a tribe may “[p]ropose to cure or otherwise 
resolve the claims”186 and that the Department will investigate the 
petitioner’s claim only if the tribe fails to respond to the claim, or fails, 
refuses, or is unable “to cure or otherwise resolve” the claim.187 Even 
though the provision for a petitioner’s written consent to a proposed 
tribal resolution of the claim is placed several sections ahead of these 
provisions, reading all the provisions together is the only logical choice. 
If they are read together, the rules then offer a tribe without its own 
process, or a tribe that has proceeded through its tribal process but left 
an unsatisfied interested party, an additional opportunity to resolve the 
matter. That is, after the interested party has filed a proper petition with 
the Secretary, the tribe may propose a resolution. If the interested party 
consents to that proposal in writing, and the Director of the Office of 
Indian Energy and Economic Development concurs,188 then the matter is 
settled. This understanding of the rules not only demonstrates proper 
respect for tribal processes, but also offers a further opportunity for 
settlement directly between the tribe and the interested party. 
D. Trust Responsibility 
A final crucial concern with the ITEDSA model is the nature of the 
Secretary’s trust responsibility. The statute directly addresses federal trust 
obligations. The Secretary is directed to “act in accordance with the trust 
responsibility” and to “act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
185 The rules expressly require the department to interpret ITEDSA and its 
implementing regulations “in accordance with the self-determination and energy 
development provisions and policies in the Act” and “liberally construe” the statute 
and regulations “for the benefit of tribes to implement the Federal policy of self-
determination.” Id. § 224.20. 
186 Id. § 224.114(d). 
187 Id. § 224.115. 
188 The rules provide that Interior must investigate a petitioner’s claim unless 
“[t]he tribe has failed, refused, or was unable to cure or otherwise resolve each claim 
made in the petition within a reasonable period, as determined by the Director.” Id. 
§ 224.115(b). Although it is unclear from the plain language what “as determined by 
the Director” modifies, Interior reads the phrase as applying to the tribe’s proposed 
resolution of the claim. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,816. The proposed rule on the same 
subject provided expressly that the Director should investigate if A[t]he Director did 
not accept the tribe’s proposed resolution in which the petitioner agreed.” 71 Fed. 
Reg. at 48,640. One commenter objected that the Director should not be able to 
reject solutions mutually agreed upon by the tribe and the interested party, but 
Interior responded that it believed its trust responsibility required it to maintain 
oversight of negotiated resolutions. 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,816. 
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Indian tribes.”189 Nothing in ITEDSA “shall absolve the United States 
from any responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes.”190 The Secretary is 
obligated to protect the interests of tribes in case any other party to a 
specific instrument violates the terms of the instrument or any federal 
law, or any provision of a specific instrument violates a TERA.191 
Nonetheless, ITEDSA specifies that “the United States shall not be liable 
to any party (including any Indian tribe) for any negotiated term of, or 
any loss resulting from the negotiated terms of” any instrument executed 
pursuant to an approved TERA.192 
In hearings prior to passage of the statute, tribal representatives 
argued that ITEDSA absolves the federal government of its trust 
responsibilities for energy resources without removing ultimate federal 
control over resource development.193 The Navajo Nation, which had just 
received an adverse decision from the U.S. Supreme Court regarding 
federal liability for the loss of some $600 million in coal royalties,194 was 
particularly vehement. The Nation favored “streamlining” the resource 
development process as a way of promoting “efficiency, accountability, 
and self-determination.”195 However, it did not believe that ITEDSA 
promoted true tribal decision-making: 
While these bills purport to put tribes in the driver[‘s] seat of 
decision making, they continue to empower the federal 
government to act as the traffic cop who is authorized to put its 
hand out to stop a tribe’s car from moving. Both bills ultimately 
preserve the federal government’s final authority over energy 
leases. Such final authority constitutes the lead role. This scheme, 
wherein a cabinet Secretary has prescriptive control over decisions 
regarding Indian energy development, but no subsequent liability, 
is an abdication of the federal trust responsibility that is patently 
unfair to tribes.196 
The concerns reflected in this statement are multiple. Tribes are 
concerned that all the costs of energy development are being shifted 
onto them without sufficient resources to meet those costs. Tribes will 
absorb the costs—both direct and indirect—of preparing TERAs, 
negotiating leases, agreements, and rights-of-way, conducting 
environmental reviews, and responding to challenges by “interested 
189 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(A). 
190 Id. § 3504(e)(6)(B). 
191 Id. § 3504(e)(6)(C). 
192 Id. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii). 
193 ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 101 (testimony of the Navajo Nation); see id. 
at 107 (supplemental statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation); see id. at 
118 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the 
Wind River Indian Reservation). 
194 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 500, 514 (2003). 
195 ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 104 (supplemental statement of Joe Shirley, 
Jr., President, Navajo Nation). 
196 Id. at 107. 
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parties.” Grant funds will be available to offset some of the costs, and the 
Department of the Interior is instructed to assist with advice and 
expertise to the extent that it can. But inevitably tribes will bear 
substantial costs. 
Tribes will also bear substantial liabilities in the event that things go 
awry. If a tribe does not have adequate resources to provide information 
and expertise in negotiations, and sufficient federal assistance is not 
forthcoming, the federal government bears no responsibility. If the 
Secretary provides information to the energy companies, but not the 
tribes, the federal government bears no responsibility. 
To a great extent, the trust provisions of ITEDSA mirror those of the 
1982 Indian Mineral Development Act. Under the IMDA, the Secretary is 
directed to act “in the best interest of the Indian tribe.”197 Nothing in the 
statute “shall absolve the United States from any responsibility to Indians” 
arising from the trust doctrine, and the Secretary is obligated to protect 
tribal rights in case of a violation of any minerals agreement.198 The 
Secretary is also obligated to provide “advice, assistance, and 
information” to tribes during negotiations “to the extent of his [sic] 
available resources.”199 But as with ITEDSA, the IMDA specifically 
provides that “the United States shall not be liable for losses sustained by 
a tribe” under a minerals agreement.200 The absence of trust litigation 
under the IMDA may indicate that the statutory structure of the trust 
responsibility functions reasonably well.201 
There is, however, one significant difference between the IMDA and 
ITEDSA: under the IMDA, the Secretary approves or disapproves each 
specific agreement for mineral development. In making that 
determination, the Secretary is bound not only by the vague “best 
interest of the Indian tribe” standard, but is instructed to consider such 
factors as potential economic return, financial effects on the tribe, 
marketability of the minerals, and environmental, social, and cultural 
effects on the tribe.202 Thus, while the Secretary is not a guarantor against 
tribal financial losses, the Secretary’s failure to consider or adequately 
account for specified factors might subject the government to damages 
for breach of trust. 
No such potential fall-back exists with ITEDSA. Once a TERA is 
approved, tribes make the unilateral decisions whether to enter into a 
specific development instrument and how each specific instrument 
should be structured. The Secretary retains the obligation to protect 
197 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b) (2000). 
198 Id. § 2103(e). 
199 Id. § 2106. 
200 Id. § 2103(e). 
201 As noted earlier, there has been only one reported case litigated under the 
IMDA, and it did not involve an allegation of breach of trust. See Quantum 
Exploration, Inc. v. Clark, 780 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986). 
202 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b); 25 C.F.R. § 225.3. 
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tribes against violations of specific instruments by other parties, but 
otherwise is free of responsibility. 
Nonetheless, I am not convinced it is going to be a problem. What 
made the Navajo coal lease case203 such a betrayal was that there was 
nothing the Navajo Nation could have done to see it coming or to head it 
off. The leases were issued under the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s protestations to the contrary, the federal 
government controlled IMLA leases, subject only to tribal consent. Tribes 
relied on the Secretary’s expertise and obligations, in part because they 
had no choice if they wished to develop their resources. The coal lease at 
issue called for adjustment of the royalty rate after twenty years, and the 
Navajo Nation negotiated without knowing that the Secretary of the 
Interior was undermining its efforts by providing crucial information 
only to the coal company.204 The Navajo Nation acted in good faith 
reliance on the government’s trusteeship, and the government betrayed 
that trust. Then, to make matters worse, the Supreme Court held that the 
government did not violate any specific statutory or regulatory duty 
under the IMLA, and was therefore not liable in damages under that 
statute. The outrage of that decision is palpable in comments on the bills 
that became ITEDSA. 
But that level of tribal trust in the government may, and should be, a 
thing of the past. Even if Secretary Hodel’s actions in the Navajo coal 
case were not in violation of the IMLA or its regulations, simple ethics 
should prevent a repeat of the situation. And even if they don’t, the clear 
lesson of the Navajo case for tribes is that over-reliance on the good faith 
of the government can be a dangerous thing. Tribes need, as a practical 
matter if nothing else, to look out for their own interests.205 
And the modern statutes—ITEDSA as well as the IMDA—make that 
clear. Unlike the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, which encouraged tribal 
dependence on government decision-making, the modern statutes set 
forth a clear bargain. Tribes can take advantage of new options and 
increased practical sovereignty, but in exchange the government has a 
203 Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 488, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 
116–19. 
204 In fact, the lease authorized the Secretary to readjust the royalties to a 
“reasonable” rate after twenty years. The Navajo Nation initiated proceedings several 
years before the adjustment provision would take effect, and the department’s initial 
decision was to raise the royalties from the “extremely low” rate of thirty-seven and 
one-half cents per ton to twenty percent. The coal company appealed, and the 
Secretary then directed that any decision on the appeal be deferred so that the coal 
company and the Navajo Nation could negotiate an adjusted royalty rate. Navajo 
Nation v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 221 (2000). Those negotiations, based in 
part on the Secretary’s ex parte communications with the coal company, resulted in a 
royalty rate of twelve and one-half percent, the federal minimum, which the Secretary 
then approved. Id. 
205 Said with full understanding that many tribes simply don’t have the resources 
to be able to do so. 
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deeply discounted trust responsibility. Tribes can opt in to this system or 
not, at their discretion. The overt nature of the statutory deal, along with 
the stark reminder of the Navajo case, should mean that tribes are 
sufficiently on notice if they choose the TERA route offered by ITEDSA. 
Whether the trade-off is worthwhile is a decision for each tribe to make 
for itself. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mineral development in Indian country is embarking on an exciting 
new phase. ITEDSA offers tribes a new approach, one where tribes 
themselves make the ultimate decisions about specific development 
activities. Like any new approach, however, ITEDSA is fraught with 
potential snags and problems. It still requires federal approval of tribal 
regulations for mineral development. It is too limited in the minerals it 
covers, does not adequately address tribal financial and technical 
concerns, mandates considerable public input into tribal decision-
making, and limits the federal government’s trust responsibilities. The 
TERA approach under ITEDSA is not the best approach for all mineral-
owning tribes, but it will be the best approach for some. For those tribes 
with the willingness, as well as the technical and financial capabilities, to 
take advantage of ITEDSA, the statute provides a major step toward true 
tribal self-determination over resource development. 
